Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 713The economic value of reciprocal bilingualism by Ramon Caminal & Ramon Caminal
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series  
Working Paper nº 713 
 
The Economic Value of Reciprocal 
Bilingualism 
Ramon Caminal 
 September 2013 The economic value of reciprocal bilingualism￿
Ramon Caminal
Institut d￿ An￿lisi Econ￿mica, CSIC, and Barcelona GSE
September 2013
Abstract
Some bilingual societies exhibit a distribution of language skills that can-
not be explained by economic theories that portray languages as pure commu-
nication devices. Such distribution of skills are typically the result of public
policies that promote bilingualism among members of both speech commu-
nities (reciprocal bilingualism). In this paper I argue that these policies are
likely to increase social welfare by diminishing economic and social segmenta-
tion between the two communities. However, these gains tend to be unequally
distributed over the two communities. As a result, in a large range of circum-
stances these policies might not draw su¢ cient support. The model is built
upon the communicative value of languages, but also emphasizes the role of
linguistic preferences in the behavior of bilingual individuals..
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11 Introduction
Language skills are typically attained in a sequential fashion. Individuals initially
acquire a ￿rst language at home (native language or mother tongue) and later in
their life they learn one or more second languages. It is well understood that the
economic return on second language acquisition is particularly high in societies with
multiple native languages. Indeed, a well functioning economy requires a common
language, a lingua franca, and the majority language is usually the most e¢ cient
candidate. If size does matter for e¢ ciency, what should be the role of a language
with a relatively small number of native speakers in a multilingual environment?
Indeed, some policies that promote the learning and use of minority languages are
constantly scrutinized and often heavily criticized. Even more so in societies where
all minority speakers are also competent in the majority language and hence the
ability to communicate is not at stake. In this context, does it make any sense to
promote the learning of a minority language among members of the majority speech
community? Can such reciprocal bilingualism generate any economic gains, given
that these additional skills are apparently redundant?
These are the main questions I address in this paper. I build on an extensive
literature that has taken an economic approach to study languages. Since the distri-
bution of language skills a⁄ects economic outcomes (see, for example, MØlitz (2008)
on international trade, and Chiswick (2008) on labor market outcomes), econo-
mists have also paid attention to the incentives to acquire second languages. The
standard game-theoretic analysis (Selten and Pool,1991; Church and King, 1993)1
portrays di⁄erent languages as alternative communication devices. Individuals de-
cide whether or not to acquire a second language by comparing the learning costs
(in terms of time and money) with the bene￿ts (the ability to communicate and
do business with members of other speech communities.) An important ingredient
of this approach is the presence of network externalities: the value of knowing a
language increases with the number of its speakers. When they take decisions in
isolation, individuals do not internalize such externalities and hence, with respect
to the social optimum, underinvest in language skills. In other words, the private
return on second language acquisition is lower than the social return, which opens
the door to e¢ ciency-enhancing public policies.
1See also G￿th et al.(1997), Gabszewicz et al. (2008) and Ortega and Tanger￿s (2008). Gins-
burgh and Weber (2011) provide an excellent overview of the economic research on languages.
2Models based exclusively on the communicative value of languages have signi￿-
cantly contributed to our understanding of the relation between language skills and
economic outcomes. However, they are somehow put under stress when we exam-
ine bilingual societies where monoglots of the minority language practically do not
exist and as a result communication is guaranteed by the universal knowledge of
the majority language. Below I pay particular attention to three European regions
that meet this criterion: Wales, the Basque Country and Catalonia. Regarding
the acquisition of a second language, we observe that a fraction of the majority
speech community do learn the minority language. On top of that, native speak-
ers of the minority language, despite the fact that they are bilingual, transmit the
minority language to the next generation.2 Regarding economic outcomes, there is
some empirical evidence indicating that bilingual individuals enjoy a comparative
advantage with respect to monoglots of the majority language in labor markets.3
Thus, markets seem to price positively the knowledge of the minority language for
reasons beyond its communicative value.
In contrast to most of the economic literature, sociolinguists have always em-
phasized that a language is much more than a communication device. Language
and culture are tightly interconnected and both impact on a person￿ s identity. As
a result, when people chooses which language to use, learn or transmit, they take
into account not only relative communicative advantages but also their emotional
attachment. Using the economics jargon we can say that individuals develop pref-
erences about the language they use daily and eventually transmit to the next
generation.
The notion of linguistic preferences has already been implicitly or explicitly used
in a variety of contexts. Wickstr￿m (2005) builds a dynamic model to examine the
2The implications of the traditional approach on the pattern of intergenerational transmission of
languages have not been completely spelled out. Suppose that bilingual parents can only transmit
one language. If they care about the welfare of their children then they will prefer to transmit the
majority language and minimize their children￿subsequent learning costs. The problem becomes
more complicated if bilingual parents can transmit both languages. However, provided that in this
case they incur into an incremental transmission cost, then the minority language will be expected
to gradually disappear.
John and Yi (2001) develop a dynamic model of language learning and transmission, focusing
exclusively on the communicative value of languages. Unfortunately, decisions about intergen-
erational language transmission are not formalized as the solution of an optimization problem,
but rather represented by a reduced form. Nevertheless, in their model the long-run survival of
minority languages requires geographic isolation.
3In particular, bilingual individuals face better job opportunities and obtain higher earnings.
See Drinkwater and O￿ Leary (1997) and Henley and Jones (2005) for the case of Wales, and
Rendon (2007) and Di Paolo and Raymond (2012) for the case of Catalonia.
3survival of minority languages. In his framework the intergenerational transmis-
sion of languages implicitly depends not only on the practical value of the language
as means of communication, but also on the emotional attachment of the par-
ents. However, linguistic preferences are not speci￿ed and decisions about language
transmission are represented by a reduced form. Similarly, Grin (1992) presents a
dynamic model to study the evolution of language use. Linguistic preferences are
explicitly speci￿ed, but the set of decisions that determine the evolution of language
skills are not (he also takes a reduced form approach).4 In a di⁄erent vein, Iriberri
and Uriarte (2012) examine the role of the information structure in determining the
use of minority languages in occasional social interactions. In their model language
skills and preferences are ￿xed. Finally, in a previous paper (Caminal, 2010), I
studied the provision of linguistic diversity in markets for cultural goods and media
products. Like Iriberri and Uriarte, I assume a ￿xed distribution of language skills
and preferences.5
In this paper I ignore the long-run dynamics of language use and transmission,
and instead focus on the role of linguistic preferences in the feedback between the
distribution of language skills and economic outcomes. I argue that the propensity
to cooperate with members of other speech communities does not only depend on
the ability to communicate but also on the potential con￿ ict of interests over the
language of use. In other words, while I build on the communicative value of lan-
guages I also emphasize that multilingual individuals are not indi⁄erent about the
language of use in di⁄erent types of social and economic interactions. The model
is static in the sense that linguistic preferences are exogenous, but language skills
are endogenously determined. In combination with network externalities, linguistic
preferences drastically change the welfare assessment of alternative distributions of
language skills. In particular, I claim that policies that promote reciprocal bilin-
gualism (everyone learning the other, non-native language), by limiting the scope
of the con￿ ict over the language of use, can improve the patterns of cooperation in
society and generate signi￿cant welfare gains.6
4Consequently, neither of these two models is suitable for welfare analysis.
5In the context of a monopolistically competitive model I show that, with respect to the social
optimum, market outcomes are biased in favor of stronger languages. In other words, markets
provide too little linguistic diversity.
6Clearly, linguistic preferences have a social component closely related to ethnic or national
identity. The analysis in this paper clearly falls short in this dimension. On top of the e⁄ects
studied here, reciprocal bilingualism may reduce interethnic con￿ ict by reducing observable dif-
ferences. However, some groups may oppose policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism if they
4The next section reviews a sample of bilingual countries and regions in Europe
and North America. The sample is admittedly small, but nevertheless su¢ ciently
rich to re￿ ect a large variety of situations, both in terms of the relative strength of
the two languages and the propensities of members of each community to become
bilingual. It is emphasized that in some of these regions we observe a distribution of
language skills that can not be explained by the communicative value of languages.
However, it also becomes readily apparent that examples exhibiting high levels of
reciprocal bilingualism are hard to ￿nd. Both observations are rationalized by the
theoretical model.
Sections 3 and 4 examine a simple model that illustrates the main trade-o⁄s.
I consider the impact of alternative distributions of language skills in a bilingual
society (the two languages are labeled S and W) where individuals obtain economic
gains from cooperating with others. These cooperative tasks, or partnerships, re-
quire communication and hence the use of a particular language. Some high produc-
tivity partnerships include two individuals with di⁄erent mother tongues. Hence, as
in traditional models, cooperation requires partners to share a common language.
In this framework the ability to communicate is not su¢ cient in order to materialize
all potential gains from cooperation because individuals have linguistic preferences
(although they di⁄er in the intensity of those preferences.) Those individuals with
a strong preference for using their mother tongue are willing to give up the ex-
tra economic gains from a high productivity partnership in exchange for a better
linguistic match. More speci￿cally, in the regime where only W￿native speak-
ers become bilingual (asymmetric bilingualism), then any high productivity match
between two linguistically heterogeneous individuals must use language S. As a re-
sult, those W￿native speakers with a strong preference for the use of their mother
tongue will choose to quit the high productivity match and settle in a linguistically
homogeneous, lower productivity match. The privately optimal separation rule is
not socially optimal because the potential partner (in this case, a S￿speaker) losses
with the separation. Alternatively, in the regime where members of both speech
communities become bilingual (reciprocal bilingualism) the fraction of ine¢ cient
separations is lower. The reason is twofold. First, the distribution of language skills
is symmetric and cooperation can take place in either language. Hence, there is
a higher chance that at least one of the members of the match feels less strongly
perceive them as a threat to their identity.
5about the language of use and accepts conducting the tasks in her second language.
Second, it becomes possible to adopt a more balanced pattern of language use (say,
￿fty-￿fty), which again makes unilateral separations less likely.7 As a result, pro-
vided learning costs are not too high, reciprocal bilingualism is socially optimal
because it minimizes economic and social segmentation.8
The distributional implications of shifting from the ￿rst to the second regime are
not trivial. It is clear that W￿native speakers always gain since the frequency of in-
e¢ cient separations decreases and, moreover, they enjoy a more favorable linguistic
treatment. However, even abstracting from learning costs, the e⁄ect on S￿native
speakers is ambiguous. On the one hand, they bene￿t from less frequent ine¢ -
cient separations, yet on the other hand lose their power to impose their preferred
language.9
The model must be closed by specifying how learning decisions are taken. Several
alternative scenarios are considered. In the ￿rst scenario (following the standard
literature) learning decisions are taken by individuals. Such an assumption may not
be very suitable in some cases. In particular, the examples reviewed in Section 2
indicate that public policies are essential in determining the distribution of language
skills. Thus, we need to consider the case that learning patterns are the result of
some kind of collective action. An important aspect is the choice of jurisdiction,
at least in cases where speech communities are geographically segmented. Thus, I
explore a second scenario where learning decisions are taken by two di⁄erent bodies,
each representing the interests of a speech community. These two scenarios do not
necessarily provide the same answer, since individual decisions may also generate
an externality on other members of their speech community. Finally, in the third
scenario decisions are centralized. In this case the speci￿c characteristics of the
political system are crucial to predict how possible con￿ icts of interests may be
7In the present model di⁄erences in language skills prevent exploiting all the gains from coop-
eration. In the real world these di⁄erences may be also used to generate monopolistic rents by,
for instance, restricting the access of certain jobs to speakers of a particular language. A model
capturing such rent seeking activities would provide additional channels by which reciprocal bilin-
gualism is bound to raise social welfare.
8There is a sizable literature on occupational segregation by race and ethnicity. See Patel
and Vella (2007) or Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) for recent examples. Language seems an
important part of these stories. However, the existing data does not allow us to separate the
ability to communicate from linguistic preferences.
9Lazear (1999) examines the incentives of immigrants to form ghettos in order to avoid the
costs of learning the majority language (or, more generally, the costs of assimilation). In my model
segmentation occurs also because bilingual individuals have linguistic preferences.
6resolved.10
Section 5 presents various extensions of the baseline model, including heteroge-
neous learning costs, the possibility of using monetary compensations in exchange
for a more favorable language treatment, the size of cooperation groups, and the
weight of speech communities. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 The distribution of language skills in bilingual
societies
The coexistence of two (or more) languages in the same area is compatible with dif-
ferent distributions of language skills over the population. In particular, members
of di⁄erent speech communities may have di⁄erent propensities to learn the other
language. It will be useful to de￿ne three stylized scenarios. In the ￿rst, all individ-
uals remain monolingual and hence communication across speech communities is
impossible (Segmented Bilingualism, SB). A second clear-cut scenario is one where
all native speakers of a particular language, say language W, learn language S, but
all S￿native speakers remain monolingual. In this case, the relative position of the
two languages is highly asymmetric, with one strong language (S) that serves also
as a lingua franca (in inter-community communication) and a weak language (W),
used only in intra-community communication (Asymmetric Bilingualism, AB). In
the third extreme scenario all individuals become bilingual and hence in principal
there is no hierarchy between the two languages, since inter-community communi-
cation can take place in either language (Reciprocal Bilingualism, RB).11 The chief
focus of this paper is on the second and third benchmarks, but this section o⁄ers
a broader perspective, since most real world examples tend to be more mixed. In
order to consider intermediate cases, it will be useful to introduce two indices, an
index of communication (due to Lieberson, 1964) and an index of reciprocity (a
natural extension) between speech communities. In particular, if we denote by ￿i
the fraction of i￿native speakers that are competent in j;i;j = S;W;i 6= j; then
we can de￿ne the index of communication, C, as:
C = ￿
S +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
S￿
￿
W
10Under majority voting the relative size of speech communities plays a crucial role, However,
other regimes may be able to implement more e¢ cient outcomes.
11Linguists tend to classify bilingual societies according to the functional distribution of the
languages. In fact our three scenarios are closely related to the three standard functional categories:
bipartlingualism, disglossia, and ambilingualism.
7This index takes values between 0 and 1, and measures the probability that in
an heterogenous bilateral match (one S and on W￿speaker) there is at least one
common language, and hence subjects can communicate. We can also de￿ne the
index of reciprocity, R, as
R = ￿
W￿
S
Note that R also takes values between 0 and 1 and measures the fraction of
redundancies. That is, in an heterogeneous bilateral match R measures the proba-
bility that both individuals are bilingual, and hence from a strictly communicative
point of view one of the languages is redundant.12
Thus, in the ￿rst scenario (SB) we have C = R = 0; in the second (AB) C = 1,
R = 0; and in the third (RB) C = R = 1.
Next, let us brie￿ y discuss a sample of bilingual regions or countries and whether
they exemplify the three extreme scenarios mentioned above. For each case I have
relied on a di⁄erent source and as a result there is no guarantee the values of the
￿￿ s reported are comparable. However, comparability is not a major concern since
the purpose here is purely illustrative. Also note that the political status of these
geographical areas varies considerably. Again, my immediate concern is not to
explain their di⁄erences, but rather to simply demonstrate the mere existence of
alternative patterns of bilingualism.
The ￿rst benchmark (SB) is relatively uncommon since geographical proxim-
ity and/or political ties tend to generate strong incentives to overcome language
barriers. Cyprus may perhaps be considered a su¢ ciently good example. For the
last four hundred years the two main languages of the island have been Turkish and
Greek. Historically, many Turkish-Cypriots also spoke Greek, while Greek-Cypriots
almost always remained monoglots. However, as a result of the de facto political
separation of the two communities in 1975, the number of bilingual Cypriots is
nowadays negligible, especially among the younger generations (See, ￿zerk, 2001).
Many European regions where the vernacular language is still the mother tongue
of a fraction of the population are fairly close to the second benchmark (AB).
In a few cases minority languages have recently experienced a modest expansion.
Two well-known examples are Wales and the Basque Country. In Wales Welsh is
12Note that these indices are independent of: (i) the relative size of speech communities and
(ii) the distance between the two languages. Hence, they provide a rough measure of the average
language skills of an heterogenous match, but they neither re￿ ect the frequency of these matches
nor the di¢ culty of learning the second language. .
8spoken by about 20% of the population (2001 census), and practically everybody
speaks English. The UK census does report knowledge of languages but not mother
tongues, hence it is impossible to learn the fraction of English native speakers that
are able to speak Welsh. However, the renaissance of Welsh in the main urban areas
and among the 5-14 age group in the 1990￿ s suggest that a non-negligible fraction of
English native speakers became competent in Welsh (Aitchison and Carter, 2004).
The education reforms in the late 1980￿ s were a crucial driving force by making
Welsh compulsory in schools up to age 16.
Data about mother tongues is more readily available for the Basque Country.
Spanish is the native language of 78% of the population, while the other 22% report
Basque as their mother tongue (Gobierno Vasco, 2006). As in the case of Wales,
all Basque speakers know the dominant language (Spanish, in this case). However,
a signi￿cant 13% of the native Spanish speakers also know Basque. In fact, Basque
is compulsory in schools and recently has become the main language of instruction
for two thirds of students in primary and secondary school.
Both Wales and the Basque Country seem to deviate from the AB scenario.
Since all native speakers of the minority language do learn the dominant language,
in terms of the ability to communicate native speakers of the majority language do
not need to learn the minority language: their learning e⁄orts appear somewhat
redundant. Nevertheless, some of them do it under a policy scheme that can be
interpreted as a gesture of reciprocity.
Let us turn now to case where a non-negligible fraction of both speech com-
munities are monoglots: Quebec and Belgium. In Quebec there are two o¢ cial
languages, French and English. According to the 2006 Census, 8% of the popula-
tion speak English and 79% speak French as their native language. Although French
is more popular in the province, English is more valuable as a lingua franca outside
Quebec. It turns out that 57% of native English speakers also acquire French as
a second language, while 44% of native French speakers know English.13 Thus, the
incentives to become bilingual seem stronger for native English speakers: the local
dominance of French apparently dominates the value of English as a lingua franca.
If we take Canada a whole as the reference area then the relative size of these two
13These ￿gures cannot be directly computed from census data. In order to pin down these
coe¢ cients I have assumed that those individuals whose mother tongue is a non-o¢ cial language
(12%) learn either French or English in proportion to the size of these two speech communities.
If some members of this group learn them both then the real value of these two coe¢ cients would
be smaller.
9coe¢ cients would be reversed, since few English native speakers outside Quebec
know French.
From a linguistic point of view Belgium can be divided into three regions: Flan-
ders, populated mainly by Dutch native speakers (almost 60% of the Belgian pop-
ulation), Wallonia, populated mainly by French native speakers (more than 30% of
the population) and Brussels, one of the capitals of the European Union, a melting
pot of Belgian citizens and foreigners, where French is somewhat more predomi-
nant than Dutch. This is why I have chosen the entire country as our reference
area, as otherwise we end up with linguistically homogeneous regions. According
to Van Parijs (2007), just 15% of French native speakers acquire Dutch as a sec-
ond language, while more than one half of Dutch speakers learn French. Thus, in
this speci￿c case the incentives to become bilingual seem to be much stronger for
Dutch speakers, not because of domestic reasons (the French speaking community
accounts for less than 40% of the total population) but rather due to the value of
French as a lingua franca. The values of ￿￿ s reported above are easily explained by
the course o⁄ers of second languages, which are independently determined by each
region (Desmet and Vermeire, 2000).14
The patterns of second-language learning in Belgium and Quebec are compatible
with the traditional theory of languages as pure communication devices (Gabsewitz
et al., 2008). In both cases a signi￿cant fraction of the two linguistic communities
can a⁄ord to remain monolingual. However, many others do become fully bilin-
gual. A positive level of reciprocity (as measured by our index) is consistent with
the traditional theory since it is privately optimal that individuals learn a second
language in order to gain access to the monoglots in the other community. In other
words, from a purely communicative point of view their learning e⁄orts may very
well not be redundant in expectation.
However, the standard theory cannot explain the patterns of language acquisi-
tion in Wales and the Basque Country. Since everybody there speaks English or
Spanish the learning e⁄orts of the members of the dominant speech community
seem redundant. However, the fraction of individuals with presumably anomalous
14Several former soviet republics exhibit language patterns similar to those in Belgium and
Quebec. According to Ukraine￿ s 2001 Census and Latvia￿ s 2011 Census, about two thirds of the
population consider the local languages (Ukrainian and Latvian) their mother tongue, and the
other third report Russian. While two-thirds of native speakers of the local language also speak
Russian, the fraction of Russian native speakers that also speak the local language vary from 12%
in Ukraine to 60% in Latvia.
10behavior is relatively small, and hence some observers may not value them as force-
ful counterexamples. In this respect our last example, Catalonia, is more striking.
In this region the degree of reciprocal bilingualism is exceptionally high. In a recent
survey (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2008), 32% of the population reported Catalan,
while 57% reported Spanish as their mother tongue.15 As in the Basque Coun-
try, all native Catalan speakers also know Spanish. What is more unusual is that
about 75% of the Spanish native speakers also speak Catalan. Thus, the degree of
reciprocal bilingualism is not too far from its maximum.
A crucial determinant of the widespread knowledge of Catalan among Spanish
native speakers is the language policy of the regional government. The explicit
aim is universal bilingualism and the main ￿eld of intervention is the school system
where Catalan is the main language of instruction.16 It is noteworthy that those
policies have enjoyed a broad social consensus. Over the last thirty years policies
that promote Catalan, and determine its privileged role in compulsory education,
have only been challenged by small political parties that together never represented
more than 15% of the seats in the regional parliament. In fact, casual evidence
suggests that the language policy of the Catalan government has been contested
much more strongly in the rest of Spain than in Catalonia.17 Summarizing, the
pattern of bilingualism in Catalonia is rather unique, at least in the context of
Europe and North America. Both the distribution of language skills and the broad
consensus over policies that generate such a distribution are somewhat puzzling
for those who adopt the view that languages are basically neutral communication
codes.
The next table reports the values of C and R for the regions discussed above,
and provides a quantitative overview.
15The relative number of Catalan native speakers have drastically decreased over the last ￿fteen
years as a result of very large immigration ￿ ows, specially from Latin America.
16Such an asymmetric language policy in favor of the weaker language produces balanced results:
(i) At the end of compulsory education students￿level of pro￿ciency in Catalan and Spanish
are similar (Consell Superior d￿ Avaluaci￿ del Sistema Educatiu, 2007). Moreover, the level of
pro￿ciency in Spanish of students coming out of Catalan schools is similar to the rest of Spain
(Instituto de Evaluaci￿n, 2011).
17According to a recent survey (Fab￿ and Llaberia, 2011) the level of social con￿ ict associated to
the use of languages in Catalonia is very small. In particular, a large majority of respondents report
no problem in using either language. Only 5% of respondents report trouble or inconvenience
for having used Spanish, while using Catalan has been somewhat problematic for 15% of the
respondents.
11C R
Cyprus small very small
Wales 1.00 small
Basque Country 1.00 0.13
Quebec 0.76 0.25
Belgium 0.59 0.08
Ukraine 0.70 0.08
Latvia 0.90 0.44
Catalonia 1.00 0.75
Two main lessons can be drawn from the previous discussion. First, the cases of
Wales, the Basque Country and especially Catalonia are di¢ cult to reconcile with
the traditional economic theory of second language acquisition. If a language was
a neutral communication device and all members of the minority were bilingual,
then native speakers of the dominant language would never be willing to incur
the learning costs when the communicative value of their e⁄ort is null.18 In other
words, they would actively oppose public policies promoting reciprocal bilingualism.
Second, examples with high levels of R are hard to ￿nd.
One could perhaps try to explain the ￿rst observation by invoking some kind of
distortion in the political system. I doubt there exists a plausible political model
that will be able to explain the broad political consensus in Catalonia. The second
observation could perhaps be interpreted as an indication that reciprocal bilingual-
ism is not able to generate sizable social gains. This paper o⁄ers an alternative
view: reciprocal bilingualism may cause a relatively large increase in social welfare,
but in many scenarios it might fail to gather su¢ cient political support because
those gains tend to be unequally distributed across speech communities.
3 The benchmark model
Consider an economy populated by a mass one of individuals, whose ￿rst language
is either S or W: For now suppose that the two speech communities have the same
size. The ￿rst language or mother tongue will determine the linguistic preferences
of bilingual individuals according to the pattern speci￿ed below.
18It is important to note than in these regions native speakers of minority languages learn the
majority language and nevertheless they pass the minority language on to the next generation. See
Fab￿ and Llaberia (2011) for the case of Catalonia. Linguistic preferences appear as an essential
ingredient of any relevant explanation of such transmission pattern.
12Learning a second language provides two types of return. First, it facilitates
domestic interactions. This is the main focus of the analysis, and hence these type
of bene￿ts are endogenous. Second, the newly acquired language may also be useful
in non-domestic interactions and/or may provide access to the stock of media and
cultural goods supplied in that language. These latter bene￿ts will be described
by a ￿xed (exogenous) parameter, Bi;i = S;W. Without loss of generality, let
BS ￿ BW. In other words, despite of the fact the two communities have the same
size, S is a relatively stronger language, because of its non-domestic status.19
Individuals play the following two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, they may
acquire a second language by incurring a cost F (same for both S and W): An indi-
vidual that learns a second language becomes equally functional in both languages,
but this does not imply that is indi⁄erent about the language used in any social
interaction. For the moment I assume that each individual pays its own learning
cost.20
In the second stage, once the language skills of the population are ￿xed, indi-
viduals obtain the two types of returns on their learning e⁄orts. Regarding the
exogenous bene￿ts I will ￿rst focus on the case BS > F and BW = 0. The ￿rst
assumption, BS > F, implies that W￿native speakers have always incentives to
learn S: the only possible equilibrium scenarios are AB and RB. The second as-
sumption, BW = 0, is a normalization, since S￿native speakers will take their
learning decisions depending on whether the endogenous bene￿ts from learning W
are higher or lower than the "net costs", F ￿ BW: As for the endogenous bene￿ts,
I assume that each individual can potentially form a high productivity partnership
only with a particular individual that is randomly selected from the entire popu-
lation. Everyone has the same probability of becoming an individual￿ s potential
partner, independently of their language skills and preferences. A high productiv-
ity partnership can only be formed if partners can communicate with each other
(if they share at least one language) and if they reach an agreement over the lan-
guage of communication. If the partnership materializes then payo⁄s depend on
the language used. An i￿native speaker obtains 1 if i is adopted as the language of
19For instance, in the case of Belgium, French would be the stronger language, S; since it is
more valuable than Dutch as an international lingua franca. Similarly, in the case of Catalonia it
is also obvious that Spanish is the stronger language.
20Alternatively, we can best think of F as the total cost, including the time and e⁄ort that
individuals must exert, but also the ￿nancial expenses (classrooms, books, etc.), which can perhaps
be funded by general taxation. Such a distinction will become important when we examine the
distributional e⁄ects of public policies.
13communication. On the contrary, she obtains 1 ￿ ￿ if j;j 6= i; is adopted. ￿ is an
independent realization of a random variable distributed over
￿
0;￿
￿
with density
function h(￿) and distribution function H (￿): Let us denote by b ￿ the uncondi-
tional average. Summarizing, each partner obtains a monetary return of 1 from a
high productivity partnership, and ￿ re￿ ects the disutility (measured in monetary
units) associated to the use of a second language.21
Thus, communication in a high productivity partnership can take place in S or
in W: But it can also take place in both languages (on a ￿fty-￿fty basis), a regime
denoted by SW. In this case, each individual obtains 1 ￿ ￿￿, where ￿ ￿ 1
2 is an
exogenous parameter. That is, the utility loss from using a second language half of
the time is less or equal than one half the loss from using a second language all the
time. If interpreted literally, this assumption indicates that the marginal disutility of
using the second language for an additional unit of time (weakly) decreases with the
amount of time using the second language. Alternatively, a ￿fty-￿fty arrangement
can also be interpreted as if both partners are in fact able to use their native
language. In a two-person environment this may simply mean that individuals can
send messages in their native language but they receive messages in their second
language. A parameter ￿ lower than 1
2 may re￿ ect the fact that individuals care
relatively more about the language of the messages they send than of the messages
they receive.22 Finally, ￿ ￿ 1
2 may simply re￿ ect equity considerations: Using a fair
scheme may be jointly perceived as more desirable than any extreme pattern.
If the highly productive partnership does not form, then the expected payo⁄
for each individual in the alternative activity is 1 ￿ ￿ < 1. Such a payo⁄ can be
interpreted as the monetary return obtained in a less productive activity that does
not require the use of a language. Similarly, it may be the return from cooperating
with other available members of the same speech community.
For simplicity, it is assumed that in the ￿rst stage individuals only know the
distribution of ￿ (all individuals are ex-ante identical in this respect), and privately
21￿ can represent indistinctively a pure preference for using the mother tongue or the limited
competence in the second language, and hence the extra e⁄ort needed to communicate using that
language. Vaillancourt (1982) shows that, in the case of francophones in Quebec, the preference for
using their mother tongue in consumption activities weakens as their ￿ uency in English improves,
Nevertheless, those individuals with excellent knowledge of English still have a pure preference for
using French.
22In the context of more complex organizations, multilateral communication can take place
simultaneously in more than one language. Thus, an SW regime may simply mean that each
individual can communicate with the center in her native language and the use of the second
language is limited to interactions in small groups
14learn their realization at the beginning of the second stage, right before they meet
their potential partners. At this point, both their native language and knowledge
of a second language are common knowledge. The only dimension that remains
private information is their own realization of ￿. Such asymmetry of information
appears as a reasonable representation of the real world and will play a crucial role
in the analysis. In Section 5 I comment on the e⁄ects of the imperfect observability
of language skills and native languages.23
Also, for simplicity it is assumed that potential partners negotiate over the
language of communication using a very simple bargaining protocol.24 The three
possible linguistic regimes are S;W or SW: When potential partners meet one of
them is chosen with equal probability as the proponent, who makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o⁄er within the set (S;SW;W): The respondent either accepts or rejects
the o⁄er. If both members of the potential partnership belong to the same speech
community there is obviously no obstacle in using the common native language
as the language of communication. However, if they belong to di⁄erent speech
communities then the strategic incentives will depend on their language skills and
their values of ￿.
It is important to note that, for the moment, potential partnerships are not
price mediated. In other words, the distribution of monetary surplus is ￿xed and
unconditional to language skills or the language of communication. This is probably
a good description of many types of social interactions where it is impossible to price
discriminate on the basis of the individual￿ s linguistic attributes. In any case price
mediated agreements are examined in Section 5.
Imposing some restrictions on parameter values will simplify the presentation
without signi￿cantly a⁄ecting the main economic insights. In order to interpret
these restrictions it will be useful to outline some features of equilibrium behavior. If
both potential partners of the productive match share the same mother tongue, then
the match is formed with probability one, since the relationship can be conducted
in their favorite language and everyone obtains a payo⁄ equal to 1; which is higher
than their opportunity cost, 1 ￿ ￿. However, if one of them, say the W￿native
speaker, is bilingual but the S￿speaker is monolingual, then, independently of who
23In a di⁄erent setup, Iriberri and Uriarte (2012) show that asymmetric information about
language skills reduces the use of the weak language below e¢ cient levels.
24It is well known that under asymmetric information the optimal mechanism involves ex-post
ine¢ ciencies. Our particular protocol should be interpreted as a simple representation of these
ine¢ ciencies.
15is the proponent, the partnership will materialize if and only if is pro￿table for
the W￿native speaker: if and only if 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿: Finally, if partners have
di⁄erent mother tongues but are both bilingual, then their optimal strategies are
more complicated since all three regimes (S;SW;W) are feasible.
Assumption 1 ￿ ￿ 2￿
Assumption 1 indicates that from a social point of view all feasible (at least
one bilingual individual) high productivity partnerships should be formed. In other
words, for all values of ￿, total payo⁄s from forming the initial match, 2 ￿ ￿; are
higher than their opportunity cost, 2(1 ￿ ￿): In other words, high productivity
partnerships are always socially e¢ cient.
Asumption 2 ￿ > ￿:
Assumption 2 implies that there exist some bilingual individuals (with a su¢ -
ciently high value of ￿) that will reject the e¢ cient partnership if the language of
communication is her second language. Assumptions 1 and 2 taken together imply
that ine¢ cient separations will occur with a positive probability when one of the
communities is monolingual.
Note that ￿￿ ￿ 1
2￿ ￿ ￿. The ￿rst inequality comes from the assumption that
￿ ￿ 1
2; and the second follows from Assumption 1: Hence, for all values of ￿ bilingual
individuals will willing to form the partnership if an SW policy is adopted.
Neither of these assumptions is essential in the derivation of the main qualitative
results, but they greatly simplify the presentation by reducing the number of cases
under consideration.
The model laid down in this section is static. A possible, and more elegant, alter-
native would be to introduce linguistic preferences in the standard dynamic model
of the labor market with matching frictions. Suppose that coalitions collapse at
some exogenous rate and freed individuals are matched with potential partners also
at some exogenous rate. Matched individuals negotiate the conditions of coopera-
tion. If they reach an agreement, which will depend on their linguistic preferences,
then the coalition is formed, otherwise individuals remain "unemployed" and wait
until the next opportunity arrives. In a model like this reciprocal bilingualism will
also increase the probability that a match actually forms a coalition, cutting down
"unemployment" spells. Such a model would certainly be more elegant, but much
16less tractable. On top of that I doubt it would be able to bring about additional
insights. In other words, the proposed model can probably be thought of as a simple
representation of a labor market subject to matching frictions.
4 Analysis of the benchmark model
Since ￿
S > F, W￿ native speakers have always incentives to learn S; independently
of the potential bene￿ts arising from domestic interactions. Hence, the only two
possible equilibrium scenarios are AB and RB.
4.1 Asymmetric bilingualism
Suppose that at the second stage W￿speakers are bilingual but S￿speakers remain
monolingual. Half of the potential high productivity partnerships will be formed
by linguistically homogeneous individuals who will face no obstacle reaching an
agreement. However, the other half of the matches includes two individuals with
di⁄erent mother tongues. Obviously, the language of use must necessarily be S,
and the partnership will materialize if and only if it is individually rational for the
W￿speaker; i.e., if and only if 1￿￿ ￿ 1￿￿, a condition that is independent of the
identity of the proponent: As a result, the respective expected payo⁄s of S and W
speakers will be given by:
U
S
AB =
1
2
+
1
2
fH (￿) + [1 ￿ H (￿)](1 ￿ ￿)g = 1 ￿
￿
2
[1 ￿ H (￿)]
U
W
AB =
1
2
+
1
2
￿Z ￿
0
(1 ￿ ￿)dH (￿) + [1 ￿ H (￿)](1 ￿ ￿)
￿
= 1￿
￿
2
[1 ￿ H (￿)]￿
1
2
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
Thus, a fraction 1 ￿ H (￿) of productive partnerships formed by linguistically
heterogeneous individuals will fail, and a fraction H (￿) will succeed. In a successful
partnership only the W￿speakers bears the cost of using their second language. As
a result US
AB > UW
AB.
4.2 Reciprocal bilingualism
Suppose now that at the second stage both communities are bilingual. In linguis-
tically heterogeneous matches, if the proponent is an S￿speaker (the situation is
perfectly symmetric if the proponent is a W￿speaker) she anticipates that o⁄er-
ing an SW policy will be accepted with probability one by the potential partner.
17Hence, she has no incentive to o⁄er W. If she o⁄ers SW then she obtains 1￿￿￿. In
the event she proposes S then she anticipates that with probability H (￿) the o⁄er
will be accepted, but with the complementary probability the potential partner will
quit. Hence, she obtains a expected payo⁄ equal to 1 ￿ [1 ￿ H (￿)]￿. Therefore,
she ￿nds it optimal to o⁄er SW if only if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ [1 ￿ H (￿)]: Note that in
principle ￿ may be higher or lower than ￿. If ￿ ￿ ￿, then independently of the
identity of the proponent, the partnership will materialize with probability one and
the language policy will be SW. As a result UW
RB = US
RB = 1 ￿
￿b ￿
2 : A bit more
complicated is the case where ￿ < ￿. With probability H (￿), a linguistically
heterogeneous partnership sticks together and conducts the relation under an SW
policy. With probability [1 ￿ H (￿)]H (￿), the partnership is also formed but the
respondent bears all the disutility derived from a monolingual policy. Finally, with
probability [1 ￿ H (￿)][1 ￿ H (￿)] the partnership breaks down.
Consequently,
U
W
RB = U
S
RB =
1
2
+
1
2
￿
1
2
p +
1
2
r
￿
where p and r are the respective expected utility of the proponent and the
respondent, which can be written as:
p =
Z ￿
0
(1 ￿ ￿￿)dH (￿) + [1 ￿ H (￿)]f1 ￿ ￿[1 ￿ H (￿)]g
r = H (￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿b ￿
￿
+ [1 ￿ H (￿)]
￿
1 ￿ ￿[1 ￿ H (￿)] ￿
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿
Combining these expressions we obtain
U
W
RB = U
S
RB = 1￿
￿
4
Z ￿
0
￿
￿ + b ￿
￿
dH (￿)￿
1 ￿ H (￿)
4
￿
[1 ￿ H (￿)]2￿ +
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿
In contrast to the previous scenario, now speech communities are in a symmetric
situation and hence all individuals obtain the same expected payo⁄.
4.3 Comparing alternative scenarios
The computations are presented for the case ￿ < ￿, but the qualitative results also
hold in case ￿ ￿ ￿.
Let us ￿rst focus on total surplus, TS. In this case the total gains derived from
shifting from AB to RB, ￿T ￿
￿
UW
RB + US
RB
￿
￿
￿
UW
AB + US
AB
￿
; can be written as:
￿TS = H (￿)
￿
￿[1 ￿ H (￿)] +
1
2
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿
￿
￿
2
Z ￿
0
￿
￿ + b ￿
￿
dH (￿) > 0
18Let us compare the negotiation outcomes in heterogeneous matches across the
two regimes. Let ￿
S and ￿
W be the realizations of the disutility parameter of the
S and W speaker, respectively. In the AB regime the identity of the proponent
is irrelevant, since all that matters is the realization of ￿
W. Also, both speech
communities have the same ex-ante preferences. Hence, the total expected surplus
in the RB regime is also independent of the identity of the proponent. Thus,
we only need to compare the negotiation outcomes in the two regimes when the
S￿speaker is the proponent. If ￿
S > ￿ then both the RB and AB regimes deliver
the same outcome, i.e., the S￿speaker o⁄ers to conduct the relationship in S and
the respondent accepts if and only if ￿
W < ￿. However, the two regimes di⁄er
if ￿
S < ￿: In this case, the match breaks down in the AB regime if and only if
￿
W > ￿; but never breaks down in the RB regime. Thus, ine¢ cient separations
are less likely in the RB regime. Also, total costs of using a second language varies
across regimes. If ￿
W < ￿ the relation is then conducted in S in the AB regime
and in SW in the RB regime. Hence, there could be realizations of ￿
S and ￿
W
for which the total surplus generated in the AB regime may be higher than in the
RB regime. However, even when ￿ takes its highest possible value (￿ = 1
2), these
realizations cannot a⁄ect the sign of the total change in expected surplus, which is
mainly driven by the reduction in ine¢ cient separations.
It is important to note that ￿T increases as ￿ decreases. In other words, if
individuals value an SW policy (lower ￿) more, then the social bene￿ts of reciprocal
bilingualism increase.25
Whether or not RB is socially optimal clearly depends on the di⁄erence between
costs and bene￿ts:26
Proposition 1 Reciprocal bilingualism is socially optimal if and only if F ￿ ￿T.
Let us now look at the distributional implications of shifting from AB to RB.
We know that US
AB > UW
AB and UW
RB = US
RB: Moreover, average welfare increases,
which taken together with the previous results implies W￿speakers must be better
25RB also raises welfare if the SW regime is not feasible and individuals must select either S or
W.
26In our social welfare function all individuals have the same weight (the social planner maxi-
mizes total surplus). If, alternatively, the social planner is averse to inequality, then in principle it
should promote RB more vigorously, since AB generates inequality by favoring the S-community.
Or course, if we take into account other determinants of individual welfare (like monetary wealth)
then distributional concerns may turn against RB if S-speakers are relatively poorer. In any case,
I ￿nd the idea of using language policy as a redistribution device quite inappropriate.
19o⁄ in the RB regime:
￿U
W ￿ U
W
RB ￿ U
W
AB > 0
The reason is twofold. First, the frequency of ine¢ cient separations is lower in
the RB regime. Second, whenever high productivity partnerships succeed, W￿speakers
obtain a better linguistic treatment.
In contrast, the e⁄ect on S￿speakers is much less straightforward. In particular:
￿U
S ￿ U
S
RB ￿ U
S
AB = (1)
H (￿)
8
￿
4￿[1 ￿ H (￿)] + 2
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿
￿ ￿
Z ￿
0
￿
￿ + b ￿
￿
dH (￿) ￿
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
If ￿ is su¢ ciently low then the above expression is clearly positive. However,
for relatively high values of ￿ the sign of ￿US is ambiguous. Suppose that h(￿) is
symmetric around the mean. Moreover, ￿ = 1
2, and ￿ = b ￿: Hence, H (￿) = 1
2 and
￿ = ￿. In this case ￿US = 1
8
h
b ￿
2 ￿ E
￿
￿ j ￿ ￿ b ￿
￿i
: Thus, if the density function
is uniform US
RB = US
AB, but if h(￿) is increasing (decreasing) for ￿ ￿ b ￿, then
US
RB < (>)US
AB.
As we move from the AB to the RB regime, S￿speakers also bene￿t from a
lower frequency of ine¢ cient separations, but they also lose their strategic advan-
tage (their language monopoly power) in the negotiations. The result is that they
su⁄er worse language treatment. It turns out that the second e⁄ect may actually
dominate.
Even if US
RB ￿US
AB > 0, if S￿speakers bear the full cost F, then their incentives
to learn W will be insu¢ cient from a social point of view. More speci￿cally, if we
let F S = US
RB ￿ US
AB, then we can state the main result as follows:
Proposition 2 If F 2
￿
max
￿
F S;0
￿
;￿T
￿
and S￿speakers bear the full cost of
learning W, then they will prefer not to acquire a second language even though it
would raise total surplus.
Obviously, if some of the learning costs are covered by general taxation (and
hence paid by W￿speakers) then S￿speakers incentives would improve. However,
as shown above, even if W￿speakers o⁄er to fully compensate S￿speakers for their
learning costs, they would still refuse if ￿US < 0.
205 Extensions
5.1 Heterogeneous learning costs
Suppose that individuals face di⁄erent learning costs (like in Gabszewicz et al.,
2008). Now the cost of learning a second language for an individual, F; is an
independent realization of a random variable distributed over
￿
0;F
￿
, with density
function j (F) and cumulative distribution J (F). It is still assumed that BS > F
and hence all W￿speakers learn S (￿W = 1): However, BW = 0 and in equilibrium
a fraction ￿S of S￿speakers learn C:
5.1.1 Symmetric information on language skills
Suppose we maintain the assumption of the benchmark model according to which
individuals can observe both the native language and the language skills of their
potential partner and can condition their strategies on such information. The out-
come of heterogeneous matches has been described in Section 4.1 if the S￿speaker is
monolingual and in Section 4.2 if she is bilingual. The incentives to learn W are still
given by ￿US (equation 1), then J
￿
max
￿
￿US;0
￿￿
is the fraction of S￿speakers
that become bilingual in equilibrium. This version of the model generates predic-
tions about the di⁄erences in expected earnings by di⁄erent linguistic groups. First,
bilingual S￿speakers obtain in average a higher monetary return than monolingual
S￿speakers. The reason is the probability that their match with a W￿speaker fails
is lower. Second, the expected monetary return of a W￿speaker is intermediate
between the bilingual and monolingual S￿speakers, since they have a chance of
meeting one type or the other.
Finally, the analog of Proposition 2 would be the following:
Remark 1 If F > ￿US, the fraction of bilingual S￿speakers is ine¢ ciently low.
Starting at the equilibrium value, a small exogenous increase in ￿S generates
second order losses on the additional bilingual S￿speakers, but ￿rst order gains in
W￿speakers, who now face bilingual S￿speakers more often.
5.1.2 Asymmetric information on language skills
An alternative, perhaps more realistic, scenario is one where heterogeneity of learn-
ing costs interacts with additional dimensions of asymmetric information and/or
21some kind of institutional inertia. More speci￿cally, suppose that both native lan-
guage and knowledge of the second language of potential partners are not observ-
able, or at least they are not observable at the time of choosing strategies. The
latter can be interpreted as a form of institutional inertia, where the language pol-
icy of various organizations is set by members of one of the two speech communities
before they actually learn the identities of their potential partners. In other words,
I assume the proponent sets language policy as a function of ￿S but ignoring the
identity of the potential partner; that is, a W￿speaker ignores whether the po-
tential partner is another W￿speaker, a monolingual S￿speaker, or a bilingual
S￿speaker. Similarly, an S￿speaker does not know whether the potential partner
is another S￿speaker or a bilingual W￿speaker.
The details of the analysis are postponed to the Appendix. Here I provide a
brief summary of results. As expected, in this case the strategy of W￿speakers as
proponents varies with ￿S: In particular, a higher value of ￿S induces W￿speakers
to o⁄er S less often and SW more often. As a result, a partnerships between
a W￿speaker and a monolingual S￿speaker is less likely to succeed. Also, even
though the probability of a success of a partnership between a W-speaker and a
bilingual S￿speaker does not change with ￿S; the latter expects a worse language
treatment. Summarizing, the learning decision of an individual S￿speaker gen-
erates a negative externality on the rest of her speech community. However, the
positive externality they generate on W￿speakers is even larger, at least for a set
of distribution functions that includes the uniform.
Remark 2 The equilibrium value of ￿S is likely to be ine¢ ciently low, but it would
be even lower if learning decisions where taken in order to maximize the welfare of
the S￿community.
5.2 Price-mediated agreements
How do results change if the division of monetary surplus is not exogenous, but part
of the negotiation? More speci￿cally, suppose that the proponent makes a take-it-
or-leave-it o⁄er that includes not only a language policy but also a division of the
monetary return: x for the respondent and 2￿x for the proponent. The respondent
must accept or reject the entire o⁄er. The main insights of this exercise can be
obtained by restricting our attention to the case where ￿ is uniformly distributed
on [0;1].
22Note that in a linguistically homogeneous match the average payo⁄of any indi-
vidual is still equal to 1. The reason is that the proponent always o⁄ers to conduct
the relation in the common native language and o⁄ers the respondent a compensa-
tion equal to 1 ￿ ￿, which is always accepted and yields 1 + ￿ to the proponent.
The equilibrium outcome in heterogeneous matches will depend on the regime.
Under AB S must be used in any heterogeneous partnership: If the S￿speaker is
the proponent, then she o⁄ers an agreement (S;xS). The respondent accepts if
and only if xS ￿￿ ￿ 1￿￿: Thus, it will be accepted with probability (xS + ￿ ￿ 1):
The proponent￿ s optimal o⁄er is the value of xS that maximizes her expected payo⁄:
(xS + ￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ xS)+(2 ￿ xS ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿): Hence, the optimal o⁄er is xS = 1, and
the associated probability of a breakdown is (1 ￿ ￿), as in the case with exogenous
division of surplus. However, if the proponent is a W￿speaker, then she faces no
uncertainty about the reaction of her potential partner and can capture all the
potential rents. In other words, she o⁄ers xS = 1￿￿ and captures 2￿xS ￿￿ which
is higher than 1 ￿ ￿ for all values of ￿: Hence, while half of the time the same rate
of ine¢ cient separations is obtained, in the other half ex-post e¢ ciency results.
In contrast to the benchmark case where the sharing rule was exogenous, in this
case it is not so obvious that S￿speakers are in an advantageous position vis-a-
vis W￿speakers. Even though S is the only feasible language of communication,
W￿speakers can now enjoy some informational rents: when they are proponents
they are the informed party (they know the total surplus, 2￿ ￿ ￿
W); and hence
they are able to appropriate all the surplus. In contrast, when the S￿speaker
is the proponent her ability to appropriate rents is limited by the asymmetry of
information on ￿
W. More speci￿cally, the expected payo⁄s of S and W￿speakers
are given respectively by:
U
S
AB = 1 ￿
1
4
￿(2 ￿ ￿)
U
W
AB = 1 ￿
1
4
￿
1 ￿ ￿
2
2
￿
By assumption (A.1) ￿ > 1
2; and hence US
AB is lower than UW
AB. The commitment
to use S is dominated by the informational rents that the better informed agents
(W ￿ speakers) are able to extract.27
In the RB scenario then the proponent in a heterogeneous match (say the
W￿speaker) o⁄ers a menu where x varies according to the language policy: (S;xS);
27Consequently, W￿speakers are more than compensated for the use of their second language.
23(SW;xSW); (W;xW): The respondent (S￿speaker) will choose the optimal language-
monetary return combination, provided it is higher than 1￿￿: It turns out (details
are provided in the Appendix) that if ￿ = 1
2, in equilibrium W￿speakers o⁄ers
xS = 1 ￿ ￿, and xW = 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿W
2 (SW policy is never chosen in equilibrium)
and the respondent chooses W if ￿
S ￿ ￿W
2 , and S otherwise. Hence, RB reduces
the frequency of ine¢ cient separations to zero. Moreover, it reduces total language
costs by increasing the use of W as the ratio of ￿S
￿W decreases. Summarizing, total
welfare is higher in the RB scenario and both communities are better o⁄. More
speci￿cally,
U
S
RB = U
W
RB =
43
48
> U
W
AB > U
S
AB
and hence with respect to the benchmark model S￿speakers￿incentives to learn
W improve.
5.3 Large cooperation groups
To what extent results change if we consider more complex organizations than two-
person partnerships? Let us examine the polar extreme case in which e¢ cient part-
nerships contain a continuum of agents. Since potential partners are still randomly
selected, independently of their native language, then by the law of large numbers
any high productivity partnership will have the same linguistic composition as the
population at large. In this case we need to adapt the previous formulation of the
gains from cooperation. Clearly, monetary returns must decrease with the fraction
of potential members that refuse to participate in the partnership. In particular, if
we let ￿ 2
￿
0; 1
2
￿
be the fraction of potential members that quit, then the monetary
returns of every remaining individual amounts to 1 ￿ 2￿￿: As in the benchmark
model if nobody quits then each individual obtains a monetary return of 1, and if
half of its potential members (all the members of one of the speech communities)
quit, then the monetary payo⁄ of the remaining individuals is 1 ￿ ￿.
In the AB regime, any high productivity partnership must adopt S as the lan-
guage of communication. Then a W￿speaker quits if and only if ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿:
Hence, there is a possible bandwagon e⁄ect. If individuals expect ￿ = 0, then those
individuals with ￿ > ￿ will choose to quit, which reduces the gains for the remaining
individuals. Soon, other individuals with values of ￿ below ￿ will also quit. And
this process can go on ad in￿nitum. In fact, in equilibrium:
￿ =
1 ￿ H [(1 ￿ 2￿)￿]
2
24Clearly, ￿ = 1
2 is always an equilibrium. Also, for a large class of distribution
functions (including the uniform density case) this will be the only one.28 In other
words, in the AB regime cooperation among members of di⁄erent speech commu-
nities is not feasible.
In the RB regime if an organization adopts a monolingual policy then the above
result still holds (no cooperation). However, when a bilingual policy (SW) is
adopted, an individual then will quit if and only if ￿ ￿
(1￿2￿)￿
￿ : Hence, the equilib-
rium condition now becomes:
￿ = 1 ￿ H
￿
(1 ￿ 2￿)
￿
￿
￿
Note that from assumption 1 (and since ￿ ￿ 1
2) ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ and hence ￿ = 0 is always
an equilibrium.29 Thus, in this simple speci￿cation of cooperation in large groups,
fruitful interaction among di⁄erent speech communities is only possible under RB.
This simple example suggests that the economic value RB is enhanced if cooperation
takes place in larger groups. Moreover, it also indicates that a balanced linguistic
rule (SW) can become a necessary condition to support cooperation.30
5.4 Arbitrary exogenous bene￿ts
If BS is su¢ ciently lower than F, there exist interior equilibria where both ￿S
and ￿W take values between 0 and 1: Moreover, if BS falls, then ￿W also falls
and ￿S increases. Thus, for all practical purposes qualitative results are similar
to those obtained in traditional models (Gabszewicz et al. 2008). Clearly, a lower
value of BS discourages W￿speakers from learning S: lower ￿W: As a result of the
lower fraction of bilingual W￿speakers, ￿S increases. The reason for the strategic
substitutability of the learning e⁄orts of the two communities is the net result
of two countervailing e⁄ects. As ￿W falls, on the one hand, the communicative
value of learning W increases (the probability of meeting a monoglot W￿speaker
increases and hence knowledge of a second language becomes more important to
make cooperation feasible), and on the other hand, the additional bene￿ts from
28For some distribution functions there may also exist an equilibrium with 0 < ￿ < 1
2; which
will be ingnored in the main text.:
29There is another rational expectations equilibrium with 0 < ￿ < 1
2:
30I have not discussed how language policy is chosen in multi-person organizations. Suppose
an individual is chosen at random to select the language policy. She will anticipate that if she
proposes S or W as the language of communication then cooperation is not feasible and will obtain
1 ￿ ￿: However, in the RB regime, if she proposes SW it will be accepted by everyone, and she
will get 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿.
25reciprocal bilingualism decrease as the probability of having a partner that is a
bilingual W￿speaker falls. It turns out that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates.
The main normative implications of the benchmark model also extend to the
case of heterogeneous learning costs and low exogenous bene￿ts (￿S and ￿W be-
low 1). Since individuals do not internalize the positive externalities generated by
their learning decisions the social optimum is generally characterized by values of
￿S and ￿W higher than in equilibrium. In this case we can best describe these
positive externalities as operating through two di⁄erent channels. One is related to
the communicative value of languages and the other to the enhanced cooperative
e⁄ect of reciprocal bilingualism. A higher value of ￿W implies: (i) an increase in
the probability that a monolingual S￿speaker meets a bilingual W￿speaker (with
whom communication is feasible), and (ii) an increase in the probability that a bilin-
gual S￿speaker meets a bilingual W￿speaker, which facilitates cooperation. As a
result, the entire S￿community bene￿ts from a higher value of ￿W: The symmetric
is true if ￿S increases.
5.5 The relative size of speech communities
Suppose a fraction ￿ of the population belongs to the S￿community and a fraction
1 ￿ ￿ to the W￿community. The e⁄ect of changes in ￿ are quite straightforward.
There are two major reasons why as ￿ increases above 1
2 the social bene￿ts gen-
erated by reciprocal bilingualism diminish. First, the frequency of linguistically
heterogenous partnerships, ￿ (1 ￿ ￿); decreases. Second, the total learning costs
increase as more individuals are asked to learn the weak language.
The e⁄ect of ￿ on the equilibrium outcome is equally unsurprising. As ￿ in-
creases S￿speakers have less incentives to become bilingual, as the resulting fre-
quency of linguistically heterogeneous partnerships decreases.
Throughout this paper the "strong" language (S) has been de￿ned in relation to
its international status: BS > BW: In most of the examples the "strong" language
is also the domestically dominant language. However, if ￿ is su¢ ciently small, then
W may be more frequently used and learnt more intensively than S, ￿S > ￿W:
For example, this seems to be the case for the French language in Quebec. In
other words, it may be possible that the "weak" language (W); according to our
de￿nition, is the dominant language in domestic interactions.
266 Concluding remarks
The main message of this paper is that reciprocal bilingualism is likely to raise so-
cial welfare by reducing social and economic segmentation. The underlying theory
is based on three main principles. First, languages are communication devices and
hence sharing one is a prerequisite for cooperation between members of di⁄erent
speech communities. Second, bilingual individuals are not indi⁄erent about the lan-
guage of use in social and economic interactions (linguistic preferences, of emotional
attachment to one￿ s native language). As a result, even if everyone is competent
in a particular language, and hence the ability to communicate is not at stake, a
certain degree of social and economic segmentation will remain. Third, learning a
second language generates network externalities. Consequently, individuals do not
internalize those externalities and hence public intervention is needed to implement
the social optimum. As a result, policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism may
increase social welfare by tempering the linguistic con￿ ict of interest and enhancing
cooperation.
The model is able to rationalize some empirical evidence that was puzzling for
traditional theories. In particular, in bilingual societies where everyone is competent
in the strong language, theories based exclusively on the communicative value of
languages predict no di⁄erences in labor market outcomes between monolingual
(only competent in the strong language) and bilingual workers (competent also in
the weak language.) In contrast, the current model unambiguously predicts higher
expected earnings for bilingual individuals (See Section 5.1). Also, if we were to
introduce linguistic preferences in the standard dynamic labor model with search
and matching frictions, one could anticipate that bilingual individuals would have
higher chances of reaching an agreement when matched with appropriate partners,
which would reduce their "unemployment" spells, and increase the chances of being
employed. Both of these predictions are compatible with the empirical evidence for
the Welsh and Catalan labor markets, where bilingual individuals enjoy higher rates
of employment and wage premia (See the references in footnote 3:) Regarding the
patterns of second language learning, the model provides an e¢ ciency justi￿cation
for language policies that promote the learning and use of minority languages in
regions where communication is already guaranteed by the universal knowledge of
the majority language.
Beyond aggregate welfare, the model also points out the distributional implica-
27tions of various policies, which may be crucial to understand the e⁄ects of alternative
jurisdictional arrangements and determine their feasibility in a centralized political
system.
Suppose ￿rst that policy decisions are taken by bodies that represent the in-
terests of each speech community. This is more likely when the two communities
are geographically segmented, like in Belgium. In Section 5 I argue that individual
decisions on second language learning may cause a negative externality on other
members of their speech community. As a result, policies implemented indepen-
dently by each community may result in outcomes that generate very poor social
welfare results, even worse than under laissez-faire. More speci￿cally, decision mak-
ers ignore the positive externality that their learning e⁄orts would cause on the
other community, and on top of that they do further restraint their learning e⁄orts
taking into account their internal negative externality, aggravating the underinvest-
ment problem. In this sense, centralized policy making is a necessary condition
for designing and implementing e¢ cient policies. But it might not be a su¢ cient
condition. It could be the case that reciprocal bilingualism involves higher total
welfare but lower welfare for the speakers of the strong language. In fact, under
majority voting the outcome will depend on the relative size of the two commu-
nities. Hence, it is possible that policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism do
not receive su¢ cient political support, even though they maximize total welfare.31
More generally, the implementation of the social optimum is likely to depend on
whether or not speakers of the weak language are able to ￿nd a way to compensate
speakers of the strong language. In other words, this is an instance of the political
fragility of the social optimum, which may explain why societies with high levels of
reciprocal bilingualism are relatively hard to ￿nd.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Heterogenous learning costs and unobservable language
skills
In this Appendix we provide the analytical details of the discussion of Section 5.1.2.
In principal such asymmetry of information could generate a coordination problem
for linguistically homogeneous matches. However, this problem does not arise if
we allow for a natural expansion of the strategy space. In particular, suppose
that proponents choose one of the following strategies: (i) W preferred, but SW
and S are also possible, (ii) W preferred, but SW is also possible, (iii) W only,
(iv) S preferred, but SW and W are also possible, (v) S preferred, but SW is
also possible, (vi) S only. Note that a W￿speaker will never choose strategies
30(iv) to (vi). Similarly, an S￿speaker will never choose strategies (i) to (iii). If the
proponent selects an option with a single language choice, then the respondent must
accept or reject. If the o⁄er includes more than one feasible language choice then,
in case of acceptance, the respondent must choose a particular language policy. If
the respondent rejects the o⁄er the partnership breaks down. Under such a strategy
space it is clear that proponents will choose their strategy aiming to maximize the
expected payo⁄in heterogenous groups, since they anticipate that if both potential
partners share the same mother tongue they will conduct their relation in their
preferred language.32
If we let F0 be the cost paid by the marginal individual, then in equilibrium
￿S = J (F0). The inverse function, F0
￿
￿S￿
; satis￿es F 0
0
￿
￿S￿
= 1
j(F0):
In a linguistically heterogenous partnership, if the proponent is a W￿speaker
then her expected payo⁄s associated to alternative o⁄ers are:
(i) W preferred but S accepted: UW = 1 ￿ ￿
(ii) W preferred but SW accepted: UW = 1 ￿ ￿S￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿S￿
(iii) W only: UW = 1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿SH (￿)
￿
The characterization of the optimal strategy depends on parameter values. In
order to simplify the presentation let us assume that:
Assumption 3 ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ H (￿)
If we denote by ￿1 ￿
￿(1￿￿S)
1￿￿S￿ < ￿ then we obtain the follwing result:
Result 1 W￿speakers￿optimal strategy as proponents is: (i) if ￿ ￿ ￿1, (ii) if
￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, and (iii) if ￿ ￿ ￿.
Obviously, a monolingual S￿speaker will only accept option (i), and choose S,
while a bilingual S￿speaker will always accept (i) and (ii), in the ￿rst case choosing
S and in the second SW: Finally, she will accept (iii) if and only if ￿
S ￿ ￿.
The S￿speakers￿optimal strategy in their role as proponents is analogous to
that presented in Section 4. In particular, a bilingual S￿speaker proposes: (v) if
￿ ￿ ￿, and (vi) if ￿ > ￿: A monolingual S￿speaker; obviously always proposes S:
The W￿speakers￿acceptance rule also coincides with that of the benchmark model.
Result 1 follows from the direct comparison of these three payo⁄s, taking into ac-
count the S￿speaker￿ s optimal response. Hence, the W￿speaker￿ s expected payo⁄
is:
U
W ￿
￿
S￿
= 1 ￿
1
4
￿Z ￿1
0
￿dH (￿) +
Z ￿
￿1
￿
￿
S￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
S￿￿
dH (￿) + [1 ￿ H (￿)]￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
SH (￿)
￿￿
+
￿
￿S
4
￿
H (￿)￿b ￿ + [1 ￿ H (￿)]
￿
￿[1 ￿ H (￿)] +
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿S
4
￿
￿[1 ￿ H (￿)] +
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿
Similarly, the respective expected payo⁄s of a bilingual and a monolingual
S￿speaker are:
U
S
bil
￿
￿
S￿
= 1 ￿
1
4
￿
[H (￿) ￿ H (￿1)]￿b ￿ + [1 ￿ H (￿)]
￿
￿[1 ￿ H (￿)] +
Z ￿
0
￿dH (￿)
￿￿
￿
￿
1
4
￿Z ￿
0
￿￿dH (￿) + [1 ￿ H (￿)]￿[1 ￿ H (￿)]
￿
32It is important to note that under this expanded strategy space, the assumption in the bench-
mark model that individuals could observe the native language and language skills of their potential
partners was deemed completely irrelevant since ￿S was either 0 or 1:
31U
S
mon
￿
￿
S￿
= 1 ￿
1
4
(￿[1 ￿ H (￿1)] + ￿[1 ￿ H (￿)])
Note that both US
bil
￿
￿S￿
and US
mon
￿
￿S￿
decrease in ￿S; while incentives to learn
a second language, US
bil
￿
￿S￿
￿ US
mon
￿
￿S￿
, increase with ￿S (at a decreasing rate).
Moreover, US
bil
￿
￿S = 0
￿
￿US
mon
￿
￿S = 0
￿
> 0. Also, as expected, UW ￿
￿W￿
increases
with ￿S. If learning decisions are taken by individuals, then in equilibrium:
U
S
bil
￿
￿
S￿
￿ U
S
mon
￿
￿
S￿
= F0
￿
￿
S￿
: (2)
The following assumption guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium.
Assumption 4 j0 (F) ￿ 0
This assumption implies that F 00
0
￿
￿S￿
￿ 0: Since US
bil
￿
￿S = 0
￿
￿US
mon
￿
￿S = 0
￿
>
F0
￿
￿S = 0
￿
= 0; US
bil
￿
￿S￿
￿US
mon
￿
￿S￿
is increasing and concave, and F0
￿
￿S￿
is in-
creasing and convex, then the left and right hand sides of equation (2) at most cross
each other once. If they do not cross for values of ￿S 2 (0;1) then in equilibrium
￿S = 1:
The optimal policy of the S￿community consists of choosing ￿S in order to
maximize b US = ￿SUS
bil
￿
￿S￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿S￿
US
mon
￿
￿S￿
￿
R F0
0 FdJ (F). The ￿rst order
condition of an interior solution is:
￿
U
S
bil
￿
￿
S￿
￿ U
S
mon
￿
￿
S￿
￿ F0
￿
￿
S￿￿
+
"
￿
SdUS
bil
￿
￿S￿
d￿S +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
S￿ dUS
mon
￿
￿S￿
d￿S
#
= 0
Since the second term is negative, then the ￿rst term must be positive. This
implies that (under the conditions that guarantee a unique equilibrium) the optimal
value of ￿S is smaller than in equilibrium. Since UW ￿
￿S￿
is a strictly increasing
function, the optimal value of ￿S of the W￿community is 1. Finally, since the S￿
community does not internalize the positive e⁄ect of ￿S on UW; it is obvious that
the value of ￿S that maximizes total welfare is lower than the value preferred by the
S￿community. However, it is much trickier to compare the social optimum with
the equilibrium value under individual learning decisions, since total welfare is not
generally concave in ￿S.
Let us consider the following example: ￿ = 1;￿ = ￿ = 1
2;h(￿) = 1, for ￿ 2 [0;1].
In this case, individual bene￿ts from learning are:
U
S
bil
￿
￿
S￿
￿ U
S
mon
￿
￿
S￿
=
1
16(2 ￿ ￿S)
The objective function of the S￿community is invariant in ￿S:
b U
S ￿
￿
S￿
=
7
8
Finally, the welfare of the W￿community is:
U
W ￿
￿
S￿
= 1 ￿
1
4
"
7
8
￿
3￿S
8
+
￿S￿1
2
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿S￿
￿
2
1
4
#
32where ￿1 = 1￿￿S
2￿￿S: Note that UW ￿
￿S￿
is strictly increasing and convex in ￿S:
More speci￿cally,
dUW ￿
￿S￿
d￿S =
1
16
￿
1
2
+ (1 ￿ ￿1)
2
￿
=
1
16
￿
1
2
+
1
(2 ￿ ￿S)
2
￿
Suppose learning costs are also uniformly distributed over the interval
￿
0;F
￿
.
Since the total bene￿ts of the S community do not change with ￿S, then obviously
its optimal value of ￿S is equal to zero. However, individual incentives are always
positive and increasing in ￿S: If F ￿ 1
16; then the equilibrium value of ￿S is equal
to one. If F > 1
16, then the equilibrium value of ￿S is a strictly decreasing function.
Finally, if F ￿ 3
32, then the socially optimal value of ￿S is equal to 1. If F > 3
32,
then the socially optimal value of ￿S is a strictly decreasing function. As a result,
the value of ￿S chosen by the social planner is the highes, it takes a lower value
when is the outcome of a game where with individual decision makers, and it is the
lowest value if chosen according to the interests of the S￿community.
8.2 Equilibrium strategies in the RB scenario with price-
mediated agreements
Following the notation in the main text, suppose that the W￿speaker is the pro-
ponent and the S￿speaker the respondent. Without loss of generality we can focus
on strategies that satisfy the following inequalities: xW ￿ xWS ￿ xS ￿ 1 ￿ ￿.
If xW < xWS then the respondent will never choose W; exactly as if xW = xWS.
Similarly, if xWS < xS: Finally, if xS < 1 ￿ ￿, then again the respondent will never
choose S; and might break down the match for some realizations of ￿
S. However, if
xS = 1￿￿; then this does not raise the S￿speaker￿ s opportunity cost of options W
or SW; but now the S￿speaker may sometimes choose S and increase C￿speakers￿
payo⁄ above the break down level, 1 ￿ ￿: It is important to note that xS ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
guarantees that there are no ine¢ cient separations.
For arbitrary values of (xW;xSW;xS) that satisfy the above inequalities, the
respondent must select her optimal response. W will be preferred to S if and only
if ￿
W ￿ ￿1 ￿ xW ￿ xS: Similarly, SW is preferred to S if and only if ￿
W ￿ ￿2 ￿
2(xSW ￿ xS); and W is preferred to SW if and only if ￿
W ￿ ￿3 ￿ 2(xW ￿ xSW):
There are two possible cases, depending on whether or not ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
If ￿1 < ￿2
￿
which is equivalent to xWS >
xS+xW
2
￿
then the respondent chooses
W if ￿
S ￿ ￿3; SW if ￿3 ￿ ￿
S ￿ ￿2, and S if ￿
S > ￿2: Hence, the proponent￿ s
expected payo⁄ is:
U
W = ￿3 (2 ￿ xW) + (￿2 ￿ ￿3)
￿
2 ￿ xWS ￿
￿
W
2
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿2)
￿
2 ￿ xS ￿ ￿
W￿
The optimal proponent￿ s strategy in this region is the triple (xW;xWS;xS) that
maximizes the above payo⁄ function, subject to xW ￿ xWS ￿ xS ￿ 1 ￿ ￿: It turns
out, provided we are in this region, that:
dUW
dxWS
= 4(xW + xS ￿ 2xWS) > 0
Hence, in the optimal policy xWS ￿
xW+xS
2 and SW is never chosen. In fact,
the respondent chooses W if ￿
S ￿ ￿1, and S otherwise. Hence, the proponent￿ s
expected payo⁄ is:
U
W = ￿1 (2 ￿ xW) + (1 ￿ ￿1)
￿
2 ￿ xS ￿ ￿
W￿
33The optimal proponent￿ s strategy is the pair (xW;xS) that maximizes the above
payo⁄ function subject to xW ￿ xS ￿ 1 ￿ ￿: From the ￿rst order condition for an
interior solution with respect to xW we obtain:
xW ￿ xS =
￿
W
2
(3)
Also,
dUW
dxS
= ￿1 ￿ ￿
W + 2(xW ￿ xS)
which evaluated at equation (3) is negative. Hence, the optimal proponent￿ s
strategy is xS = 1 ￿ ￿ and xW = 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿W
2 : Therefore, W is chosen if ￿
S ￿ ￿W
2 ;
and S otherwise.
The symmetric is true when S is the proponent. As a result, the expected
payo⁄s are US
RB = UW
RB = 43
48:
34